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COMMENT
ABOUT NOT KNOWING-THOUGHTS ON
SCHWAB AND HEISE'S SPLITTING LOGS: AN
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION SETTLEMENTS
Hila Shamirt
We know absurdly little about employment discrimination settlements. Although there is much theory out there about equality and
discrimination in the workplace, we suffer from a severe scarcity of
reliable information about whether and to what extent antidiscrimination laws actually reduce discrimination' and about the role of employment discrimination litigation.2 There is even less information
about employment discrimination settlements. 3 These limits of
knowledge are common to all civil settlements. They result from both
an objective reason-the difficulty of obtaining information on settlet Assistant Professor, The Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University. An earlier
version of this Comment was presented at the conference The Futureof Legal Theory in June
2010 at The Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University.
1 SeeJohn J. Donohue, The Legal Response to Discrimination:Does Law Matter?, in How
DOES LAw MATTER? 45, 45-46 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998). John Donohue
asks whether antidiscrimination law in the United States has generated any positive benefits and suggests that "virtually any conceivable statement can be backed up with appropriate supporting citations." Id. at 46. For a discussion of the effects of employment
antidiscrimination law on black workers, see id. at 53-70.
2 See Jessica Fink, Unintended Consequences: How Antidiscrimination Litigation Increases
Group Bias in Employer-Defendants,38 N.M. L. REv. 333, 334-35 (2008) (arguing that despite
important improvements in the working conditions of women and minorities brought
about by Title VII litigation, "[t]he total elimination of bias in the workplace . .. has not
been achieved" and that, in fact, bias results from such litigation, a phenomenon the article terms "litigation-induced group bias"); Tricia McTague et al., An OrganizationalApproach to UnderstandingSex and Race Segregation in US. Workplaces, 87 Soc. FORCES 1499,
1511-12, 1517 (2009) (suggesting that patterns of workforce race segregation are stable
since the 1980s despite the rise in antidiscrimination litigation); see also Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Uncertainjustice: Litigating Claims of Employment
Discrimination in the Contemporary United States 1-3 (The Am. Bar Found. Research Paper
Series 08-04, 2008) (providing sociological context to employment discrimination litigation), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1093313.
3 As Minna Kotkin suggests, "Nobody really knows what happens to [most] employment claims in the federal courts." Stewart J. Schwab & Michael Heise, Splitting Logs: An
EmpiricalPerspective on Employment DiscriminationSettlements, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 931, 935
(2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical
Study of Confidential Employment DiscriminationSettlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 111, 112
(2007)).
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ments due to nondisclosure agreements-and a methodological reason-limited academic interest in settlements due to an underlying
(and unfounded) assumption that settlements more or less mimic the
expected outcomes of disputes at trial.4 This reason is particularly
troubling because most employment discrimination claims are resolved through settlements.5 In their essay, Splitting Logs: An Empirical
Perspective on Employment DiscriminationSettlements, Stewart Schwab and
Michael Heise take on the important task of charting this unknown
territory and begin exploring what happens to employment discrimination claims beyond the trial.
Their essay focuses on a specific question: What are the main
structural factors that explain final employment discrimination settlement amounts? As the question reveals, and as the authors explain,6
the question brackets nonmonetary aspects of settlements, such as employee reinstatement or promotion. Although nonmonetary results
may affect final settlement amounts, their value is difficult to quantify,
and thus it is left out of the analysis. With this caveat in mind, while
analyzing the Chicago Judicial Settlement Project data set,7 the essay
finds that plaintiffs' demands and defendants' offers consistently exert
important influence over final settlement amounts and that these factors are more important than other factors such as the stage of the
trial or the type of discrimination claim.8 Moreover, the analysis
shows that defendants' offers exert more influence over the final settlement amount than plaintiffs' demands and that the influence of
plaintiffs' demands is indirect and better understood as being expressed through defendants' offers.9
Their essay is a significant contribution to our knowledge of employment discrimination settlements due to both the rich and expansive data set it uses and the highly sophisticated analytical treatment
the data receives. Still, it leaves the reader wanting more. In a sense,
4 See Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 959 (2010).
5
Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Emplcyment DiscriminationPlaintiffs
Farein Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 440 (2004).

Schwab & Heise, supra note 3, at 940-41.
The data set is a unique source of information on employment discrimination settlements. It includes information on 871 settlements involving nine magistrate judges in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois spanning six years (1999-2004,
inclusive). The 871 settlements include 396 usable employment discrimination cases. For
more information on the Chicago Judicial Settlement Project database, see Schwab &
Heise, supra note 3, at 940-41. For more information on how the database was created, see
Morton Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack, judicial Settlement Databases: Development and Uses,
JUDGEs' J., Winter 2004, at 19, 19-21.
8 Schwab & Heise, supra note 3, at 947-53. For a list of all the variables checked for,
including the type of discrimination claim, the stage of litigation, and others, and their
respective influence on final settlement amounts, see id. at tbls.2 & 3.
6
7

9

Id. at 947, 952.
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the essay serves to emphasize the limits of our knowledge in relation
to the effects of antidiscrimination laws on settlements and exemplifies the limited additional tools with which empirical legal studies can
provide us when we try to talk concretely about the relationship between antidiscrimination laws, workplace realities, and settlements. In
this Comment, I explore some aspects of the limits of knowledge in
relation to employment discrimination settlements, limits that Schwab
and Heise's essay tries to push against. I focus on three limits dealing
with (1) what discrimination looks like, (2) how law shapes final settlement amounts, and (3) whether empirical data can inform better policy and legislation.
LIMITs OF KNOWLEDGE I: WHAT DISCRIMINATION LOOKs LIKE
We know that trials are vanishing due to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and settlements.1 0 Although employment discrimination cases settle less frequently than other types of cases,"' 70% of
such claims in federal courts are still resolved through settlements.1 2
These numbers emphasize how limited our view of employment discrimination law is if we focus merely on trial outcomes and federal
court opinions. Yet, even if we expand our view to understand employment discrimination settlements as part and parcel of employment discrimination law, the information we can gather is limited due
to the private nature of settlement agreements, especially those subject to confidentiality agreements.13 Therefore, even considering the
many great virtues settlements bring about-such as efficiency, speed,
voice, informality, and preservation of relationships 4-the costs associated with the limits they pose to public knowledge ought to raise
questions about their net moral, cultural, and social value.
The vanishing trial is a troubling phenomenon because trials perform a social function that transcends dispute resolution. Trials "educate Americans about each other[ ] and the law."1 5 This is
10

Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in

Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPiRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461-65 (2004).

11

See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 5, at 440-41.

12

Id. at 440.

13 See Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 869 (2007).
14 For the benefits of settlements, see Matt A. Mayer, The Use of Mediation in Employment Discrimination Cases, 1999 J. DisP. RESOL. 153, 162-64.
15 Paul Butler, The Casefor Trials: Consideringthe Intangibles, 1J. EMPiHCAL LEGAL STUD.
627, 627 (2004). Paul Butler argues that trials are "one of the few official forums for story
telling. With fewer trials, we lose some public stories, and their official morals (i.e., verdicts)." Id. at 634; see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984)
(calling settlement a "capitulation" that "should be neither encouraged nor praised");
Mayer, supra note 14, at 164-66 (outlining the "cons" of mediating employment discrimination claims).
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particularly the case in relation to employment discrimination where
legal claims and judicial deliberation have an important role in informing the public about the nature of discrimination, its meaning, its
consequences, and its day-to-day workplace manifestations. 16 The
shift to settlements, therefore, significantly reduces the amount of
publicly accessible information and narratives about the way employment discrimination law plays out and the daily operation of workplace discrimination. That we have less deliberation in courts, and
consequently in the public sphere, about what discrimination might
look like impoverishes our collective understanding of inequality and
discrimination as well as the deliberative capacity of political communities to make law into a vehicle for opposing discrimination.
This consequence becomes more troubling if one accepts the historical narrative suggesting that we have now mostly passed beyond
the first generation of employment discrimination and are experiencing a new kind of discriminatory reality. The term "second generation
employment discrimination" was coined to describe the more subtle
and complex forms of inequity that are evident in contemporary workplaces.1 7 The idea is that most employers by now know what first generation discrimination looks like and how to avoid certain patterns of
behavior to preclude claims of discrimination. Most employers know
not to overtly harm an employee's working conditions or promotion
prospects because of the employee's particular identity characteristics. 18 This adaptation does not mean that discrimination has disappeared but only that it has "matured" into its second generation.
Accordingly, many discriminatory practices now are the result of structures of decision making, patterns of interaction, and informal workplace norms such as networking, mentoring, and evaluation that
result in discriminatory outcomes. This generation of discrimination
is therefore "structural, relational, and situational."' 9
In the context of employment discrimination, the turn to settlements has a particular sociocultural and legal effect. Not only do we
not know much about how employment discrimination claims settle,
but we also might not even know what employment discrimination
looks like in this second generation era. We may be able read the
court files (if they too are not confidential), but when judicial deliberation about the nature of discrimination does not follow, the claimed
16 For a discussion of antidiscrimination law as a social practice, see Robert Post, Preudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAUF. L. REv. 1, 17
(2000).
17 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A StructuralApproach, 101
COLUm. L. REv. 458, 458-60 (2001).
18 Susan Sturm argues that "[s]moking guns," such as a "rejection explained by the
comment that 'this is no job for a woman'" "are largely things of the past." Id. at 459-60.
19 Id. at 460.
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facts alone might be insufficient, especially when the case involves latent, indirect, and complex forms of discrimination. 20 Due to the
move to settlement, we lose one of the things courts do best: tell us
real life stories, dress them in legal categories, and provide a public
arena to deliberate over their meaning.
Even an expansive study like Schwab and Heise's reveals very little
about the nature of the discrimination claims. We know only the
claims' general category (e.g., race or gender). The unavailability of
further information presents a significant limit to our knowledge and
casts a shadow on the usefulness of such findings: empirical studies
can only skirt around the periphery of the phenomenon without
reaching its core.
Indeed, Schwab and Heise mention but do not engage with this
aspect of their research,2 1 and I can see why: they attempt to understand the availabledata, allowing us to focus on the material outcomes
of settlements even if not on their daily manifestations and normative
implications. They ask: In this elusive world of settlements, who gets
what and why? Final settlement amounts "travel" from employers to
employees as a result of negotiation and settlement, and the authors
want to understand how this distribution is determined. Asking this
question makes perfect sense, but it brings me to the second limit of
knowledge that lingers at the background of the essay. Their essay
explores the "who gets what" aspect, but it also raises some important
questions regarding the "why" and, more specifically, questions regarding what is the relation of the background legal order to the final
settlement amount.
LIMITs

or

KNOWLEDGE

II: How LAw

SHAPES FINAL

SETITLEMENT AMOUNTS

Schwab and Heise's essay shows that the type of discrimination
claim does not have much influence on the final settlement amount. 22
Their findings raise the question of whether and to what extent law
produced in the courtroom influences settlement negotiations. For
decades now, we have been studying legal settlements under the
20 Although Sturm raises questions about the suitability of courts to deal with second
generation employment discrimination, id. at 461-62, and calls for a "de-centered, holistic,
and dynamic approach to these more structural forms of bias," id. at 462, I would still
argue that despite the structural disadvantages of trials to capture nuanced discrimination,
the court's role in sharing stories of discrimination and discussing their normative implications is crucial for raising wide social awareness, as well as for encouraging structural workplace adjustments of the type Strum calls for. For Strum's description of the role of courts
under her proposed model, see id. at 555. Moreover, confidential settlements are still even
less equipped to meaningfully challenge second generation discriminatory practices than
courts.
21 See Schwab & Heise, supra note 3, at 941, 948-49.
22 See id. at 946, 950.
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Mnookin and Kornhauser paradigm, according to which the legal order-the state of the law as produced by legislatures and courts-influences negotiation dynamics and hence settlement outcomes.23
This is the idea of bargaining in the shadow of the law. Law is not the
only significant factor involved; other factors, such as bargaining strategies and personal preferences, are crucial as well. But as Mnookin
and Kornhauser's model suggested, in negotiations around divorce,
legal rules are important in determining the relative bargaining power
of the parties. The state of the law shapes, among other things, what
parties will insist on, what they are more likely to give up, and how
deep the compromise could reach. 24
The findings in Schwab and Heise's essay seem to raise questions
about the validity of the Mnookin and Kornhauser model. Their essay
finds that the type of discrimination claim does not affect final settlement amounts. 25 But if different discrimination claims tend to generate disparate damages awards by courts, 26 then under the Mnookin
and Kornhauser model, it would have made sense to see the same in
settlement results. Have Schwab and Heise managed to refute this
commonly held theory?
This conclusion might be too far reaching. I am not sure that the
inability to distinguish settlement amounts by the type of discrimination claim is enough to lead to the conclusion that prevailing law has
no or little impact on how settlement negotiations play out. Yet, the
finding is intriguing and raises questions about the relationship between legal precedent and settlement outcomes. Schwab and Heise
do not engage with the implications of this finding. Again, I can see
why they choose not to do so: the state of the law can help us determine a party's decision to settle, but due to the deeply contextual nature of the calculation of damages, it is difficult, if not impossible, in
most cases to find close correlations between legal precedents and final settlement amounts. Yet, the limits of our knowledge in this area
23 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
24 Id. at 959-66.
25 While "the absolute and relative strength of the plaintiff demand and defendant
offer on final settlement likely crowded out the potential influences of other independent
variables," the authors did find a relatively weak correlation when it came to race and
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) claims. See Schwab & Heise, supra note 3, at
948-49. "Interestingly, FMIA claims correspond with increased settlement amounts where
race-based claims correspond with lower settlement amounts." Id.
26 See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment
DiscriminationLaw, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 20 (1996) (showing that in 1992 Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) litigation, there was significant variation in average recovery among different types of claims). For more recent data suggesting variation in damages awarded in different types of claims, see generally OFF. OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. EQUAL
EmP'T OPPORTUNrIY COMM'N, FISCAL YEAR 2008 ANNUAL REPORT (2008), available at http://

www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/reports/08annrpt.cfm#3.
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glare at us from between the findings, highlighting our limited ability
to trace the interaction between trial outcomes and settlement
outcomes.
Schwab and Heise's findings suggest that the answer to the question of what determines final settlement amounts relies on power interactions that, to a large extent, lie outside the legal order and in the
structure of the labor market itself. This brings me to the third limit
of knowledge invoked by their essay: the implications for policymaking of understanding power relations in settlements negotiations.
LiMITS or KNOWLEDGE III: CAN EMPIRICAL DATA INFORM
BETTER LEGISLATION?

One of Schwab and Heise's clearest and most illuminating findings is that defendants' counteroffers exert more influence on final
settlement amounts than any other single variable, including plaintiffs' initial demands.2 7 One can interpret this finding to lend support
to the claim that defendant-employers have more power than plaintiff-employees in employment discrimination settlement negotiations.
Schwab and Heise do not elaborate on the normative implications of
this finding, but we might want to ask what the normative implication
of this finding may be.
How can the empirical data inform better legislation or regulation of employment discrimination claims processing? We might aspire, for example, to level the playing field and try to equalize the
parties' bargaining positions. If we think that defendants ought not to
have more power than plaintiffs in settlement processes, we might
want to create a rule to empower plaintiffs in negotiations. What
would such a rule look like? It would attempt to drive up defendant's
cost of litigation or risk of losing. This rule could therefore shape
various stages of the process, from the filing of the complaint through
the evidentiary rules or damages, to name a few. One straightforward
regulatory option might be an ex postjudicial intervention in final settlement amounts.2 8 After the parties negotiate and settle for an
amount, ajudge, with some guided discretion, could increase the final
amount. Or, the rule can attempt to offer ex ante guidance by creating
a mechanism that will increase the plaintiffs initial demand. Clearly,
any such attempt in setting the settlement amount at a higher level,
either ex post or ex ante, will be futile. Once defendants realize, with
27 Schwab & Heise, supra note 3, at 948-50.
28 This framework exists, for a different purpose, in class action lawsuits. In class
actions, the federal judge overseeing the litigation needs to approve any proposed settlement of class action litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). For a discussion of the role of
judge pursuant to Rule 23(e), see Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance ofSilence: Collective
Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 84-85 (2007).
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some certainty,2 9 that such an artificial increase is predictable, the bargaining will take place in its shadow, leading to a decrease in the level
of defendant counteroffers or final amounts, depending on the type
of legal rule adopted. This pessimistic description might be too simplistic. With some more innovative tinkering, we may be able to come
up with a more sophisticated mechanism to balance the bargaining
power between plaintiffs and defendants.
Yet, even if that is the case, we should only adopt such a rule if we
know that defendants do indeed have greater bargaining power in relation to plaintiffs so that a legal rule that balances their respective
bargaining positions is warranted. Is my interpretation of the findings, according to which defendants have more power than plaintiffs
in settlement negotiations, correct? Maybe what the empirical findings tell us is that plaintiffs are greedy or that they strategically begin
the negotiation with inflated sums. Under such conditions, it may
make sense that defendants' counteroffers are more realistic and that
they should end up having more influence over the final amount.
To know what to make of the piece of information that Schwab
and Heise offer, we need to have a better understanding of plaintiffs'
and defendants' proclivities to exaggerate and act strategically, and we
need to have tools to interpret their strategic actions as well as a normative position regarding the level of compensation that plaintiffs
should receive in discrimination claims. We may hold different positions on these issues depending on our theoretical perspective regarding the litigation process. Laura Beth Nielsen and her colleagues
offer a useful typology of such perspectives and suggest that different
theoretical perspectives give rise to different positions regarding "the
relationship between law, workplace discrimination, and social
inequality."3 0
Perhaps a better way to proceed in formulating legal rules in response to this finding is to create nuanced rules that do not lump all
employers and employees together but rather are tailored for the dif29 If the new rule increases uncertainty, the outcome of the rule change might not
significantly affect the defendant's counteroffer or the final amounts in such a straightforward way. Mnookin and Kornhauser discuss the complication that uncertainty adds in the
context of custody standards. The rule change will definitely have an effect, but its nature
will depend on the characteristics of the parties: "Discretionary standards can substantially
affect the relative bargaining strength of the two parties, primarily because their attitudes
toward risk and capacities to bear transaction costs may differ substantially." Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 23, at 980.
30 Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individualjustice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment DiscriminationLitigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7J. EMPiUCAL LEGAL STUn.
175, 176 (2010). The authors offer four perspectives to explain outcomes of discrimination cases: a formal legal perspective, a rational action/economic perspective, a legal mobilization perspective, and a critical realist perspective. Each of these positions emphasizes
different axes of explanation to the outcomes of discrimination lawsuits. See id. at 178-80.
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ferent bargaining positions of differently situated parties. For example, we can extend different rules for different types of employers and
employees and dissect the data according to the plaintiffs income and
profession, and possibly even according to the size of the or type of
employer. Then, we might face the challenge of creating rules that
are over- or underinclusive, thereby failing to provide accurate
enough proxies for the relative bargaining power of the parties. Finally, we might conclude that this finding does not provide enough
details about the parties' power balance and the intricacy of bargaining from which to generate any legal rule.
We are lead, therefore, to an unavoidable and important normative discussion of the role of legal rules in the labor market, the distributive potential of legal "intervention," the appropriate level of
damages sufficient to compensate for discrimination and to deter future discrimination, and the relative bargaining positions of employers and employees vis-A-vis each other. For us to use the new and
important information that Schwab and Heise provide to inform legislation, much more than additional information is required.
In this Comment, I focused on the frustrating character of the
limits of knowledge. But it seems that even more knowledge of the
type generated in Schwab and Heise's essay cannot singlehandedly
show us the path toward better, more just, legal rules. For this, a complementary normative, theoretical, and political account is required as
well.
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